A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal auctions while respecting the budget constraints. Achieving this goal is particularly challenging in the presence of nontrivial combinatorial constraints over the set of feasible allocations.
INTRODUCTION
A large part of auction theory deals with the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for quasilinear settings. For these settings, the VCG mechanism, or variants of it like affine-maximizers, can be applied to get optimal or near-optimal auctions. However, when we deviate from the quasilinear model, very little is known. One of the most natural and practically important feature missing from the quasilinear model is the presence of budget constraints. Budgets play a major role in several real-world auctions where the magnitude of the transactions involved naturally puts a financial constraint on the bidders. Examples of such auctions include those used for the privatization of public assets in eastern Europe, or those for the distribution of radio spectra in the US (for a discussion on this, see Benoit and Krishna [2001] ). Another important example is that of Ad Auctions where advertisers explicitly declare budget constraints. In such settings, respecting the declared budget constraints is a necessary property any Authors' address: Google Research New York, 111 8 th Avenue, New York, NY 10011; email: gagan.geol@ gmail.com; {mirrokni, renatoppl}@google.com. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. c 2015 ACM 0004-5411/2015/06-ART18 $15.00 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2757277 mechanism must satisfy. There is much discussion on the source of budget constraints (we refer to Che and Gale [1998] for a detailed discussion on this topic).
Satisfying budget constraints while keeping incentive compatibility and efficiency is a challenging problem, and it becomes even harder in the presence of complex combinatorial constraints over the set of feasible allocations. In the presence of budgets, individual rationality and truthfulness cannot be satisfied at the same time as maximizing social welfare [Dobzinski et al. 2008] , and thus the goal of maximizing efficiency can be achieved mainly through Pareto-optimal auctions.
1 Therefore, a desirable goal under budget constraints is to design incentive-compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) auctions while producing Pareto-optimal outcomes. The first successful example of such mechanisms was developed in the seminal paper of Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan [Dobzinski et al. 2008] , where the authors adapt the clinching auction framework of Ausubel [1997] to give a truthful mechanism that achieves Pareto-optimality. The clinching framework describes an ascending auction in which a price clock continuously rises and at each step the auction decides to irrevocably allocate some amount of the available goods to each player at the current price. In order to instantiate the framework, we need to specify how much to allocate to each agent at any given price.
The setting studied in Dobzinski et al. [2008] , however, captures only a simple allocation constraint: there is a limited supply of k items and each player has a value of v i for each item (and hence value of v i · t for getting t items) and budget B i . As for more general allocation constraints, there have been a couple of subsequent work capturing special families of allocation constraints, for example, unit demands [Aggarwal et al. 2009 ], or multiunit demands with matching constraints [Fiat et al. 2011] . Although these results are mainly based on Ausubel's clinching auction, each of them need to develop independent techniques to deal with their specific environment -for example, Fiat et al. [2011] define a complex clinching procedure based on trading paths in a bipartite graph and computing S-avoid matchings. Our goal in this paper is to extend these results to a much more general class of polyhedral constraints. In particular, we would like to understand for what polyhedral environments one can design such auctions, and also identify simple environments for which designing such auctions is not possible.
Our Results and Techniques. First, inspired by an application in Sponsored Search
Ad Auctions and several other applications, we study polymatroid constraints over feasible allocations and give an auction that achieves all the desired properties, that is, it satisfies IC, IR, and produces Pareto-optimal outcomes while satisfying the budget constraints. We assume that the budgets are public -which was shown in Dobzinski et al. [2008] to be a necessary assumption.
2 While following Ausubel's framework to design this auction, we need to invent the main component of the mechanism, that is, the clinching step that copes with the polyhedral allocation constraints.
We briefly describe our mechanism for a generic single-parameter environment. There is a divisible good and a set of constraints specifying which allocations of this good are feasible. Each agent has a maximum value per unit of the good and a budget. The mechanism can be described in terms of an ascending clock auction. Consider a price clock initially at zero and ascending in small increments. Also, consider the good initially unallocated. While the price in the clock is not larger than the largest valuation:
Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope 18:3 -we compute the demand of each agent, which corresponds to the amount of the good he can afford at the current price in the case the price is below his valuation and zero otherwise; -for each agent, we then compute the amount he is able to clinch in this iteration: this is the maximum amount the agent can be allocated without making infeasible any allocation that was previously feasible and respected demands; -each agent is allocated his clinched amount and is charged for this amount at the rate given by the current price, and the amount charged is deduced from his budget; -the price is increased.
In the simplest possible scenario, there is one unit of the divisible good and no further constraints. For this case, the clinched amount by any given agent is the difference between the unallocated portion of the good (remnant supply) and the sum of amounts demanded by other players (aggregate demand).
The main innovation in this article is providing a way to perform the clinching step for general environments. This is done by giving polyhedral interpretations of the remnant supply and aggregate demand. In particular, we show that if the allocation constraints form a polymatroid, then both remnant supply and aggregate demand are also polymatroids and the clinching step can be cast as a submodular minimization problem.
As a result, our mechanism has a clean geometric description that abstracts away the combinatorial complications of previous designs. This leaves the auctioneer free to focus on modeling the environment, and then use our mechanism as a black-box. This general technique not only generalizes (and simplifies) the previously known results like multiunit auctions with matching constraints [Dobzinski et al. 2008; Fiat et al. 2011 ], but also extend clinching auctions to many other applications like the AdWords Auction and settings like spanning tree auctions and video on demand [Bikhchandani et al. 2011] . Our main application is in sponsored search auctions where we model the AdWords Auction with multiple keywords and multiple position slots per keyword as a polymatroid called the AdWords polytope (see Section 4.1 for details).
In order to extend this result to more general polyhedral constraints, we turn our attention to 2-player auctions with budget constraints and prove several structural properties of Pareto-optimal truthful auctions for polyhedral environments. In particular, we present a characterization of such auctions that results in various impossibility results and one positive result. On the positive side, we present a truthful individually rational Pareto-optimal auction for any environment if only one player is budgetconstrained. On the other hand, if more than one player is budget-constrained, we illustrate simple polytope constraints for which it is impossible to achieve a truthful Pareto-optimal auction even for two players. Moreover, as a byproduct of this characterization, we get an impossibility result for multiunit auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. This impossibility result disproves an implied conjecture by Ausubel [1997] which has been reinforced by follow-up papers [Dobzinski et al. 2008; Lavi and May 2011] . Both conjectured that Ausubel's clinching auction framework could be adapted to decreasing marginals. In fact, this conjecture was reinforced by the fact that getting such an auction is possible whenever the marginals are flat. In Appendix B, we provide an explicit counter example for this case.
Both the positive and negative results follow from a characterization of auctions that are incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal given in Section 3. For the positive result, we explicitly show that the auction we designed satisfies this characterization. For the impossibility result, we fix an environment and use the characterization to determine the allocation and payments for different profiles of valuation functions. Next, we show that the allocations and payments produced are incompatible and therefore no auction can satisfy all the desired properties simultaneously.
Applications to Sponsored Search. Online advertisement is a growing business that was worth 25 billion dollars in 2010. It also has become a central piece in the current internet landscape, since it is the primary way internet companies monetize their services. A large part of this revenue comes from the search advertisement, hence it is not surprising that is has been extensively studied in the literature. The basic model of sponsored search ad auctions was proposed simultaneously by Edelman et al. [2007] and Varian [2006] . The authors model the current auction as a nontruthful mechanism and analyze its equilibrium properties. The social welfare of such equilibria were studied in Paes Leme and Tardos [2010] , , and Caragiannis et al. [2011] and its revenue properties in .
In search advertising, there are usually multiple keywords and each keyword has multiple slots associated with it. Most of the previous work treat auctions for different keywords as being independent, and therefore focus on a single keyword. A recent article by Dhangwatnotai [2011] approaches the problem of analyzing keyword auctions for multiple keywords, but it is restricted to a special case of one slot per page. Similarly, the work of Fiat et al. [2011] can be seen as an auction for multiple keywords with only one slot per page.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first work to combine multiple slots per page and multiple keywords. We do so by giving a nontrivial characterization of the set of all feasible allocations of clicks: we call it the AdWords Polytope. We show it has the structure of a polymatroid and therefore we can use our result to generate a truthful Pareto-optimal auction for this setting.
Other Related Work. There are two streams of related work. The first, like ours, is on designing truthful mechanisms when players have budget constraints with the goal of achieving Pareto-optimal outcomes; for example, Dobzinski et al. [2008] , and Fiat et al. [2011] . Bhattacharya et al. [2010a] show a budget-monotonicity property for the clinching auction of Dobzinski et al. [2008] , therefore arguing that no player can improve his utility by under-reporting his budget. Dobzinski and Paes Leme [2013] define the concept of liquid welfare, an efficiency measure for budgeted settings and study how the clinching auction approximates this benchmark.
For the case of unit-demand players, the problem of designing auctions with budget constraints has been studied in Aggarwal et al. [2009] , Dütting et al. [2013] , and Alaei et al. [2010] .
On the question of maximizing revenue, Borgs et al. [2005] gave a truthful auction whose revenue is asymptotically within a constant factor of the optimal revenue. These results were improved by Abrams [2006] . Subsequently, Hafalir et al. [2012] relax the truthfulness requirement, moving to ex-post Nash equilibrium as a solution concept, and give an auction that, in equilibrium, has good efficiency and revenue properties. The Bayesian version of the problem is well studied in the case where individual rationality is imposed in an interim sense [Bhattacharya et al. 2010b; Cai et al. 2012; Pai and Vohra 2008] . The problem becomes substantially harder when individual rationality is enforced ex-post. The later variant was analyzed by Chawla et al. [2011] . Recently, Devanur et al. [2013] use the clinching auction to design prior-free auctions with good revenue properties for both multiunit auctions and the single-keyword sponsored search setting.
Our auction also generalizes the ascending auction of Bikhchandani et al. [2011] . The authors consider environments where the set of allocations is defined by a polymatroid, but don't consider budget constraints.
The second line of related work relates to the practical problem of designing mechanisms for Ad Auctions. The work of Feldman et al. [2008] design an auction for the environment with one keyword and multiple slots. Their model is, however, different from the standard utilitarian utility model. Instead of being profit maximizers, the players are clicks maximizers, that is, the players want to get as many clicks as possible without exhausting their budget and without paying more per click than their value, which is a simpler setting than ours. In order to design their auction, they describe the structure of the set of possible randomized allocations of players to slots. We note that the structure they identify is in fact a polymatroid and use this fact to apply our auction to this setting. We further extend this characterization to the setting with multiple keywords.
Also for one keyword and multiple slots, Ashlagi et al. [2010] design an auction for the usual utility model but relax the truthfulness requirement and get an auction that is Pareto-optimal for all ex-post Nash equilibria. The main weakness in the setting of Ashlagi et al. [2010] is that the agents are allowed to be allocated only to one slot position for all the different queries of the given keyword. However, in reality, agents can be allocated to different slot positions for different queries of a given keyword. In the restricted setting of Ashlagi et al. [2010] , the Pareto-optimality requirement becomes easier to satisfy.
Independently of our work, Colini-Baldeschi et al. [2012] also study the problem of designing incentive compatible, individually rational, budget feasible and Paretooptimal auctions for sponsored search. The authors present two auctions satisfying those properties: one for the case with a single keyword but multiple slots with different click-through-rates and one for the case of multiple keywords and multiple slots with homogeneous click-through-rates (i.e., all slots are identical). Their design is also based on extending Ausubel's clinching framework, but they propose a different way to perform the clinching step based on linear programming. In contrast, our mechanism is able to perform the clinching step in linear time for the sponsored search setting using a greedy algorithm. Another difference is that their linear programming solution is specially tailored to sponsored search and to the best of our knowledge, doesn't generalize further. In particular, the two settings studied by the authors cannot be easily combined using their techniques.
Follow-Up Work. After the publication of the conference version of this work [Goel et al. 2012] , the authors published two follow-up papers extending the clinching auctions framework. In Goel et al. [2013] , we investigate if the clinching auction can implemented in the online supply setting -when items arrive through time and the auctioneer needs to allocate and charge for them on the fly. We show that for the multiunits setting, the clinching auction is supply monotone, that is, running the clinching auction with a larger supply will result in allocation and payments that are componentwise larger or equal than the original ones. This, in particular, allows for an online implementation of the clinching auction. A major open question left by that paper is if an online implementation is also possible in the general polymatroidal setting.
In another follow-up work [Goel et al. 2014] , we seek to relax the hard budget constraint. Instead of a fixed monetary quantity that cannot be exceeded, we consider a large class of constraints on the agent's ability to pay that include, hard budgets, average budgets and budgets that are a concave function of the allocated amount. Formally, we define a family of utility functions called constrained quasilinear utilities and extend the polyhedral clinching auction for agents with such utility function.
Impossibility Results. The impossibility of a Pareto-optimal auction for heterogeneous goods in the budgeted setting was given in Fiat et al. [2011] . It remained an open problem whether an auction was possible if goods were identical, that is, utilities depended only on the number of items acquired and not on which items they were. A very recent result by Lavi and May [2011] shows an impossibility result for the case where the valuation can be an arbitrary function of the number of items -that is, players are allowed to express complementarities. Since their setting is more expressive, an impossibility result is easier. Our impossibility result for multiunit auctions can be seen as a stronger version of their result, since we allow players only to express valuations with diminishing marginals. This came as a surprise to us, since it was generally believed that such a positive result could be achieved using a variation of Dobzinski et al. [2008] .
AUCTIONS FOR POLYHEDRAL ENVIRONMENTS
Consider n players, where player i has a positive value v i per unit of some good g and a budget of B i . The setting studied is single parameter: we assume that the valuations are private information of the players, whereas the budgets are public. We are also given a subset X ⊆ R n + that defines all the possible ways to allocate the good g. We assume that the subset X is a convex set that is bounded and downward closed. 3 We will call this set X an environment. Note that if player i receives x i amount of good g and pays π i , her utility u i is equal to v i x i − π i if π i ≤ B i and −∞, otherwise. However, since we will require the mechanism to never charge more than the budgets, we won't have to deal with the latter case. Our goal is to design an auction mechanism that elicits valuations v from the players and outputs a feasible allocation x(v) ∈ X and a feasible payment vector π (v) ≤ B that satisfies the following three properties.
-Individual Rationality (a.k.a. voluntary participation). Each player has net nonnegative utility from participating in the auction, that is, u i ≥ 0. -Incentive compatibility (a.k.a. truthfulness). It is a dominant strategy for each player to participate in the auction and report their true value, that is, for every player i with true value
\i , or equivalently, the valuation profile of all players except i. The characterization of single-parameter truthful mechanisms in Myerson [1981] and Archer and Tardos [2001] states that this is equivalent to x i being a nondecreasing function of v i (for a fixed v −i ) and payments being calculated
and only if there is no alternative allocation and payments where all players' utilities and the revenue of the auctioneer do not decrease, and at least one of them increases. In other words, there is no alternative (
Next we prove a useful lemma about the structure of Pareto-optimal outcomes. Later in Section 3, we will prove a more specialized version of this lemma for polymatroidal environments that will be useful for proving positive results. For the negative results concerning nonpolymatroidal environments, we will heavily rely on Lemma 2.1.
PROOF. In order to show the ⇒ direction, assume there is a dominated direction d
and we obtain same utilities and the total payment didn't decrease, since
is not in the boundary of the convex set, we can give some more of good g to some players without charging extra payments and increase their utility. Therefore, (x, π) is not Pareto-optimal.
For the ⇐ direction, suppose (x , π ) is a Pareto improvement.
and at least one inequality is strict. Summing them all up, we get that 
It follows from the lemma, that if (x, π) is a Pareto-optimal outcome in which no budget is fully exhausted, then x = argmax x∈X v t x. For very small valuations, any Pareto-optimal mechanism that satisfies individually rationality cannot exhaust budgets, so it must have the same allocation and payments as VCG.
Polymatroidal Environments
Our most interesting applications correspond to settings where the environment is a packing polytope P = {x ∈ R n + ; Ax ≤ b} for some m × n matrix with A ij ≥ 0 and b ∈ R m + . We call such environments a polyhedral environment. Examples of polyhedral environments are ubiquitous in game theory (see Nguyen and Tardos [2007] and Nguyen and Vojnovic [2011] for many examples).
A rich subclass of packing polytopes is the class of polymatroids, which are polytopes that can be written as P = {x ∈ R n + ; i∈S x i ≤ f (S)} where f : 2
[n] → R + is a monotone submodular function, that is, a function satisfying:
Such polymatroidal environments generalize matroid environments. It is easy to see that all previously studied settings are instances of these environments: Dobzinski et al's result [Dobzinski et al. 2008] corresponds to the uniform matroid and Fiat et al's result [Fiat et al. 2011] corresponds to the transversal matroid. Bikhchandani et al. [2011] give many examples of polymatroidal environments including scheduling with due dates, network planning, pairwise kidney exchange, spatial markets, bandwidth markets and multiclass queueing systems. In Section 4, we discuss some of those applications in more depth and present a novel application of polymatroids to sponsored search auctions.
CLINCHING AUCTION FOR POLYMATROIDS
In this section, we describe our main positive result, that is, an auction with all the desirable properties for polymatroidal environments. This auction is based on the clinching auctions framework of Ausubel [1997] . Before we study more complicated constraints, let's recall the clinching auction [Ausubel 1997; Dobzinski et al. 2008] for the multiunit setting, that is, P = {x; i x i ≤ s 0 }. We begin by setting the supply s = s 0 and B i the budget available to each agent. We maintain a price clock p that begins at zero and gradually ascends. For each price p, the agents are asked how much of the good they demand at the current price. Their demand will be d i =
B i p
(how much they can afford with their remaining budget) if p ≤ v i , and zero otherwise (the case where the price exceeds their marginal value). Then agent i is able to clinch an amount
+ , which is the minimum amount we can give to player i while we are still able to meet the aggregate demands of the other players. 4 Clinching means that player i gets δ i amount of the good, and δ i p is subtracted from his budget. The price increases and we repeat the process until the supply is completely sold.
The heart of the mechanism is the clinching step and generalizing it for more complicated environments involves various challenges: how does one define the notion of supply and aggregate demand (it is not a single number anymore, since there are constraints restraining the possible allocation)? Finally, we need to make sure the clinching step doesn't violate feasibility.
Clinching Framework. First, in Algorithm 1, we consider a slightly modified version of the clinching framework: we maintain a price vector p ∈ R n + and increase the prices one player at a time. The vector x ∈ R n + contains the allocations in each step. Its value in the end of the algorithm corresponds to the amount players are allocated by the mechanism. We also keep a payment vector π ∈ R n + , whose final value corresponds to the amount charged by the mechanism. 5 In the description below the index i is implicitly quantified as for all i, whileî refers to the particular agent for which we increase the price in a round-robin fashion.
For each price, we calculate the demand d i of each player, which is the amount of the good they would like to get for price p. This is calculated as their leftover budget B i − π i over the price per unit p i . Then, we invoke a procedure called clinch which decides the amount to grant to each player at that price. We update the allocation, payments and adjust demands.
6 Then we increase the price. In order to define clinching, we need to define analogues of the remnant supply and demands for the case where the the environment is a generic polytope P. Instead of being a single number as in the multi-unit auctions case, the remnant supply and Fig. 1 . Illustration of polyhedral clinching: the first two figures depict the polytopes defined in Definitions 3.1 and 3.2. The third depicts the mechanism running on polytope P: during the execution, the vector x walks inside the polytope (blue line) and the vector x + d walks outside it (red line), until they meet at the boundary. The point they meet corresponds to the final allocation. aggregate demands will be polytopes. Later, we show that whenever P is a polymatroid, then so are the remnant supply and aggregate demand.
Definition 3.1 (Aggregate Demands). Given P, a vector of allocations x ∈ P, the remnant supply is described by the polytope P x = {y ≥ 0; x + y ∈ P}. If d ∈ R n + is the demand vector, the aggregate demand is defined by P y,d = {y ≥ 0; x + y ∈ P, y ≤ d}.
In the multiunit auctions case, the amount player i clinched was the maximum amount we could give him while still being able to meet the demands of the other players. We generalize this notion to polyhedral environments (the concepts are depicted in Figure 1 ). 
The amount player i is able to clinch is the maximum amount we can give him without making any allocation for the other players infeasible. More formally,
We need to ensure that the clinching step is well defined, that is, that after clinching is performed, the vector of promised allocations is still feasible. This is done by the following lemma. LEMMA 3.3. For each step of this auction, if x ∈ P, then x + δ ∈ P.
PROOF. Let χ
i be the ith standard basis. Note that
So:
This auction is clearly truthful, since the only decision of the player is until which stage she wishes to participate in the auction. She can stop her participation earlier (which she doesn't want, since she will potentially miss items she is interested in) or later (which will potentially give her items for a price higher than her valuation). It is also individually rational, since players only get items for prices below their valuation and respect budgets by the definition. Notice that those facts are true regardless of the trajectory of the price vector: any process that increases prices (in a potentially nonuniform way) has this property. Clinching for polymatroids. Notice that we haven't used anything from polymatroids yet, so Lemma 3.4 holds for any polytope P. However, two things are left to be shown: (i) that amount clinched can be computed efficiently and (ii) that the outcome is Pareto optimal. To show both of these properties, we use the fact that P is a polymatroid.
LEMMA 3.5. If the environment is a polymatroid P defined by a submodular function f , then the amount player i clinches in Algorithm 1 is given by
Moreover, this can be calculated efficiently using submodular minimization.
The main ingredients of the proof are the following two facts about polymatroids. In the following, for a vector x ∈ R n and S ⊆ [n] we denote x(S) = i∈S x i . 
Notice thatf (·) might not be monotone. However,
is a monotone submodular function that defines the same polymatroid. PROOF. The (⇐) direction is trivial. For the other direction, notice that if f (S) <f (S) say for S = {1, . . . , i}, notice that the point x such that x j =f ({1.. j}) −f ({1.. j − 1}) for j ≤ i and zero otherwise is such that x ∈P\P.
We note that it is crucial in the previous lemma that both submodular functions are monotone.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.5. Using Fact 3.6, we know that P i x,d (y i ) is also a polymatroid defined over [n]\i by the functionf (S) = min{f (S),f (S∪i)− y i }. Now, we use Fact 3.7 to see that
Sincef is submodular, the smallest marginal can only bē
, this is exactly the expression in the statement of the lemma. Now, one can easily see that evaluatingf is a submodular minimization problem. Now we prove that the outcomes are Pareto-optimal in two steps. The first step (Lemma 3.8) is to characterize Pareto-optimal allocations for polymatroids. This characterization is stronger than that of Lemma 2.1, since it exploits the structure of polymatroids. Afterwards, we show in Lemmas 3.12 and 3.13 that the outcomes of the chinching auction defined in Algorithm 1 satisfy the two conditions in the characterization lemma.
The characterization lemma (Lemma 3.8) shows that for polymatroid environments, Pareto-optimality is equivalent to a no-trade condition, that is, once the allocation has been fixed, there is no pair of agents (two players or a player and the auctioneer) that could trade among themselves increasing the utility of one agent without decreasing the utility of the other. The following elementary facts about submodular functions will be useful in the proof of Lemma 3.8.
FACT 3.9. Given a vector x ∈ P, if two sets S, T are tight (i.e., x(S) = f (S) and x(T ) = f (T )), then S ∩ T and S ∪ T are also tight.
PROOF. The proof is quite elementary:
So, all the inequalities must be tight and therefore (Fact 3.10 ) and still get point P generating a Pareto improvement. Also, if there is an i with π i < B i and v j < v i and no tight set separating them, then for some small δ > 0, we can increase x i and π i by δ and v i δ respectively and at the same time decrease x j and π j by δ and v j δ respectively, obtaining a Pareto improvement.
For the (⇐) direction, let (x, π) be an outcome satisfying properties 1 and 2 and suppose (x , π ) is a Pareto-improvement. This means that
Using Property 2 (notice it holds for players with minimum value, the property is trivial) together with Fact 3.9, we define the following family of tight sets
there is a tight set S 1t that has i 1 but not t. If x t > 0, use property 2 to obtain this set, otherwise, simply take [n] \ t, which is tight by property 1. Let S 1 be the intersection of such sets. Now, given S 1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ S j−1 , we define S j in the following way: If i j ∈ S j−1 , take S j = S j−1 (notice can only happen if v i j = v i j−1 ). If not, for each v t < v i j there is a tight set S jt that has i j but not t. Now, define S j as the union of S j−1 and the intersection of the S jt sets.
By eliminating duplicates and its corresponding elements from {i 1 , · · · , i k }, we get a family S 1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ S k . Define T j = S j \S j−1 and it is clear the family obtained has the following properties:
Since the players in T j have exhausted their budget, π i ≥ π i . Using that and Pareto-optimality, we get i∈T j
(1) Now, we can add the inequality π i − π i ≥ v i j (x i − x i ) for i ∈ T j and obtain:
Summing those for all j we get
. Therefore, i π i ≥ i π i and therefore equal. This means in particular all of the inequalities in (1) and (2) must be tight. Therefore for all i ∈ T j , we need to have x i = x i , since if x i > x i then inequality * in (1) would be strict. If x i < x i , then inequality * * would be strict. We use this fact to show that i∈S j v i (x i − x i ) ≥ 0 by induction on j. If we show that, we can take j = k and then we are done, since this will imply that i v i x i ≥ i v i x i and therefore (x , π ) cannot be a Pareto-improvement. For j = 1, this is trivial, since we can write
since both terms are zero, and then sum v i (x i − x i ) for the rest of the elements in S 1 and use the fact that S 1 is tight. For other j, we use that
by the fact that S j is tight. Now, we argue that, for sufficiently small price raise , the outcome satisfies the two properties in Lemma 3.8 and hence is Pareto-optimal. We prove this fact using the following sequence of lemmas. LEMMA 3.11. After the clinching step is executed, and before updating prices,
PROOF. In the clinching step, given an initialf 0 , we define δ i = max{0,f 0 ([n]) −f 0 ([n] \ i)}. After we update x, π, d,f is updated tof 1 (S) =f 0 (S) − δ(S). Now, it is easy to check that 
LEMMA 3.12. The outcome (x, π) of the clinching auction is such that x([n]) = f ([n]
The proofs of the previous two lemmas intuitively establishes the maximality of the clinching procedure. Lemma 3.11 can be interpreted as saying that if we apply the clinching procedure twice, without updating prices, then the second time will have no effect. The proof of Lemma 3.12 identifies an invariant that is maintained during the execution of the mechanism. 
It is feasible for some small θ . Now, let ρ and d be allocation and demands in the algorithm just before the last time player j clinched an amount δ j > 0. If necessary decrease θ so that it becomes smaller than this last amount clinched, that is, θ < δ j . At this point ρ ≤ x ≤ ρ + d. By the definition of clinching:
At this point, ρ ≤ x and ρ j + θ < ρ j + δ j = x j . Therefore,x ≥ ρ. Also, we have that x − ρ ≤ d and x i − ρ i < d i , since agent i hasn't dropped his demand to zero yet and his demand never increases and won't be met while v i < p i . Here we are strongly using < min v i =v j |v i − v j | to ensure that for the last time player j clinches, player i demand is not zero yet. This implies thatx
, which is an absurd.
We can summarize the results as follows. THEOREM 3.14. For a polymatroidal environment, the auction in Algorithm 1 along with the clinching step described in Definition 3.2 has all the desirable properties.
Extensions of the Clinching Framework. The clinching framework described in Algorithm 1 and Definition 3.2 is quite flexible: one can change the way clinching is done or the way prices ascend and obtain an auction that is still truthful, individually rational, and respects budgets. Pareto-optimality, however, is a delicate property to achieve. A natural question is for which environments Pareto-optimality is still achievable? Here, we show we can extend this framework a little further (to scaled polymatroids). In Section 5, we will argue that it is impossible to extend any further.
If P ⊆ R n + is a polymatroid, γ ∈ R n + , then we call P γ = {x; (
) i ∈ P} a scaled polymatroid. If the environment is P γ , it is easy to see that a truthful, individually-rational, Pareto-optimal and budget-feasible auction is obtained by running the polymatroid clinching auction on P with inputs γ i v i instead of v i . It is simple to see that this is equivalent to a standard clinching auction with input values v i but price clocks advancing on a different speed for each player. Scaled polymatroids are important since they correspond to the setting of AdWords with Quality Factors discussed at the end of Section 4.1).
Faster Clinching. We showed in this section that for a generic polymatroid, we can calculate the clinched amount using submodular minimization as a sub-routine. For various environment of interest, one can find much faster clinching subroutines. In Appendix A, we show how to compute the clinching step in O(n log n) time for the single-keyword AdWords polytope.
The faster algorithms for submodular minimization due to Orlin [2007] and Iwata and Orlin [2009] run in time O(n 6 + n 5 F) where F is the time required to evaluate the submodular function defining the polymatroid.
Given the faster algorithms for the special cases of clinching, one is left wondering if there is a faster clinching procedure that bypasses submodular minimization. The answer is unfortunately no. Notice that a special case of computing the clinch(P, x, d) subroutine when x = 0 corresponds to the polymatroid membership problem, that is, deciding if d ∈ P for a polymatroid defined by the submodular function f . This problem is known to be as hard as submodular minimization itself.
THE ADWORDS POLYTOPE AND OTHER APPLICATIONS
We begin by discussing some interesting applications of the auction presented in section 3. Then we introduce a novel application of polymatroidal constraints to sponsored search auctions that generalizes the classical models of Edelman et al. [2007] and Varian [2006] .
-Multiunit Auctions [Dobzinski et al. 2008] . Corresponds to the polymatroids associated with constant submodular functions, that is, f (S) = Q, ∀S. [Fiat et al. 2011] . There is a bipartite graph ([m], [n] , E) between items [m] and bidders [n] and each buyer i has additive value 1 for each item j such that (i, j) ∈ E and value 0 for each item not connected to him. We can represent this setting by a polymatroid where f (S) is the number of items connected to some player in S. This is called the transversal matroid. -Video on Demand [Bikhchandani et al. 2011] . Consider a company that provides video on demand that is located on a node s of a directed network with capacities on the edges G = (V, E, c). Each buyer corresponds to a node in the network. An allocation x is feasible if it is possible to transmit at rate x i for each player i simultaneously. This is possible if for each subset S ⊆ [n] of players, i∈S x i is smaller then the min-cut from s to S. Using the submodularity of the cut-function, it is easy to see that the environment is a polymatroid. -Spanning Tree Auctions. Consider the abstract setting where the agents are edges of a graph G and the auctioneer is allowed to allocate goods to a set only if it has no cycles. This corresponds to the graphical matroid of graph G. A more practical setting is when a telecommunication company owns a network that contains cycles and decides to auction their redundant edges. This setting corresponds to the dualgraphical matroid of G.
-Combinatorial Auctions with Matching Constraints

AdWords Polytope
Consider n advertisers and m keywords. Each advertiser i is interested in a subset of the keywords (i) ⊆ [m]. For a keyword k, we denote by (k), the set of advertisers interested in this keyword. With each keyword k, we associate | (k)| positions. Position
Assuming that each keyword gets a large amount of queries, we see α k j as the sum of number of clicks that the jth position of keyword k gets across all queries that it matches. For now, let's assume that the number of clicks a player gets in slot j of keyword k depends only on j, k and not on the identity of the player. One is able to relax this assumption, as we see later.
Let
} be the set of all allocations (one-to-one maps) from players to slots for keyword k. Also, let (A k ) be the distributions of such allocations. Given that, we can define the AdWords polytope in the following way: an allocation of clicks x is feasible if there is a distribution over allocations of players to slots for each keyword such that player i gets x i clicks in expectation. More formally we have the following.
Definition 4.1 (AdWords Polytope). The AdWords polytope is the set of feasible allocations 7 of clicks x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that there are distributions D k ∈ (A k ) for each keyword, and
Our main result in this section is as follows.
THEOREM 4.2. The AdWords polytope is a polymatroid.
In order to prove the theorem, we first consider the setting with a single keyword and all advertisers interested in it. Let the click-through-rates be α 1 ≥ · · · ≥ α n . Feldman et al. [2008] relate the problem of deciding if a vector x is feasible to a classical problem in machine scheduling, that is, scheduling in related machines with preemptions (Q| pmtn|C max [Graham et al. 1979] ). What follows is a restatement of their characterization in a format that makes it clear it is a polymatroidal environment. We also provide a proof for completeness. 
For the converse direction, given x satisfying the conditions, we would like to find a distribution over allocations τ generating such click-through-rates. Clearly, if such distribution exists and t ij = P[τ (i) = j], then i t ij = 1, ∀ j and j t ij = 1, ∀i. The Birkoff-von Neumann Theorem states that the converse is true, that is, given probabilities satisfying these conditions, then there is a distribution over permutations that generate such probabilities. This reduces the problem of showing that the following system of inequalities has a solution i t ij = 1, ∀ j; j t ij = 1, ∀i j α j t ij ≥ x i , ∀i; t ij ≥ ∀i, j. We can do that using Farkas Lemma or alternatively the Duality Theorem of Linear Programming. They state that this system has a solution iff the following system is 18:16 G. Goel et al. infeasible:
To show this system, we will apply the condition x(S) ≤ |S| j=1 α j . First, re-order the players such that z 1 ≥ z 2 ≥ · · · ≥ z n , then
Notice that f k (S) = |S| j=1 α k j is a submodular function, so the set of feasible allocations for the single-keyword setting is a polymatroid.
For the multiple-keyword setting, we say that an allocation vector x is feasible if we can write x i = k∈ (i) x k i in such a way that the vector
The fact that this allocation set is a polymatroid is a direct consequence of the following theorem, which is a polymatroidal version of Rado's Theorem due to McDiarmid [1975] . 
Quality Factors. So far, we assumed that the click-through-rate of player i allocated to slot j of keyword k depends solely on k and j. More generally, we would like to consider the click-through-rate of a slot depending also on the player allocated in that slot. Let α k j,i be the click-through-rate of position j of keyword j when player i is placed there. Traditionally, we consider the click-through-rates in a product form, that is, α
where γ k i is called quality factor. Assuming quality factors are public information, one can, in a similar way, define a polytope of feasible allocations. In general it will not be a polymatroid.
If the quality factors are uniform among all queries, that is, γ k i = γ i , the the set of feasible allocations is given by P * γ = {x; (
* } where P * is the AdWords polytope defined as a function of α k j . It is a scaled polymatroid, for which a variant of the auction satisfying all desirable properties was shown in Section 3.
LIMITATIONS OF AUCTIONS FOR BUDGET-CONSTRAINED AGENTS
In the end of Section 3, we discussed how to extend the clinching framework to scaled polymatroids. Is there any additional flexibility that we could exploit to generalize the clinching framework beyond polymatroids? One could change the way clinching is done and one could change the price trajectories, maybe in a more sophisticated way then the one we did for the scaled polymatroids. If the trajectory is such that it only depends on P and budgets (not on values) and p i never decreases, the auction retains truthfulness and budget feasibility. Here we argue that none of these changes would generate a Pareto-optimal auction when P is not a scaled polymatroid. Assume n = 2 for simplicity and imagine that there is trajectory for the price vector p and a clinching procedure. Also assume valuations are much smaller than budgets in such a way that the mechanism cannot exhaust budgets and therefore the auction must allocate like VCG. Any such mechanism must decide on the whole allocation the first time p i = v i for some component, having only the information that v j ≥ p j for the other component, since at this point he needs to allocate to the second player. So, the environment must be such that there is a price trajectory p(t), where the optimal allocation is constant for all points ( p 1 , v 2 ) for all v 2 > p 2 . And also, it should be constant for all (v 1 , p 2 ) for all v 1 > p 1 . Notice that scaled polymatroids are exactly those environments.
Here we argued why simple modifications to the clinching auction would not work for polyhedral environments beyond (scaled) polymatroids. Now, we explore the possibility of designing an auction of a different format achieving those properties and show that this is not possible even for two players. We do so through a general characterization of Pareto-optimal auctions with desirable properties. Before stating the characterization, we study the case with one budget-constrained player and prove some lemmas that are useful in proving the general characterization result later.
One Budget-Constrained Player
For ease of exposition, we first focus on two players and assume that the feasible set of allocations P has a smooth and strictly concave boundary, in the sense that for
In fact, one can approximate any polytope by such a set using the technique of Dolev et al. [2012] . Using compactness arguments, it is possible to get an auction for the original environment by taking the limit of the auctions obtained for its C ∞ -approximations.
Assume that player 1 is not budget constrained and player 2 has budget B 2 and let (x * , π * ) be the VCG mechanism for this setting. Now, we can define the function
is monotone. Moreover, when coupled with the appropriate payment rule, it generates a Pareto-optimal and budget feasible mechanism PROOF. The main part of the proof is to show that the allocation is monotone. If we show that, it is clearly budget feasible for player 2, since we use the VCG-payment rule until the point the budget of player 2 gets exhausted and from that point on, the allocation is constant. When the budgets of the players are not exhausted, the allocation is efficient (since it mimics VCG) and therefore is Pareto-optimal. The allocation when the budget of player 2 is exhausted is equivalent to the VCG allocation of a pair (v 1 , v 2 ) with v 2 ≤ v 2 , so player 1 is getting x * 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) ≥ x * 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) by monotonicity of VCG. This implies Pareto-optimality as a consequence of Lemma 2.1.
Monotonicity. The allocation rule is clearly monotone for player 2. We need to show it is monotone for player 1, that is. that the function t → x 1 (v 1 + t, v 2 ) is monotone nondecreasing. It is clearly so for intervals where ξ (v 1 + t) ≥ v 2 , so let's assume that for t ∈ (− , + ) we have ξ (v 1 + t) < v 2 . Our goal is to show that:
Since the VCG-allocation lies in the boundary of P, this is the same as showing that
The crucial observation is that the VCG-payment for player 2 on the curve (v 1 + t, ξ(v 1 + t)) is constant, that is,
Now, we can simply differentiate it with respect to t. We use the notation ∂ i f (·) for the derivative of f with respect to the ith variable. We also define x *
2 ) decreases with v 1 by the definition of the VCG allocation. A variant of the proof can be used to show the following result for two budget constrained players. This is useful for our general characterization.
COROLLARY 5.2. If the functions ξ 1 (v 2 ), ξ 2 (v 1 ) are such that the regions {v; v 2 ≥ ξ 2 (v 1 )} and {v; v 1 ≥ ξ 1 (v 2 )} are disjoint, then one can define
) is a mechanism with the desirable properties.
This corollary has a strong fixed-point flavour and it is tempting to believe one could get the existence of such a mechanism from this theorem. However this is not true, as shown in the next section. However, this result remains useful as a tool for searching for such mechanisms whenever they exist. For example, one can extend this theorem to prove the existence of the mechanisms for polyhedral environments when B 1 is much larger then B 2 .
Characterization and Impossibility
Now we discuss our main negative result: which states an impossibility of extending the auction for polymatroids to general polyhedral environments.
THEOREM 5.3 (IMPOSSIBILITY). There is no general auction for every polyhedral environment and every pair of budgets that satisfies the desirable properties.
We prove it in two steps: first we prove a sequence of lemmas characterizing 2-player auctions for polyhedral environments satisfying all the desirable properties. Then we fix a specific polyhedral environment and argue that no mechanism can possibly satisfy this characterization.
First, we begin by understanding the format of an auction with the desirable properties where the environment is a packing polytope P ⊆ R 2 + . We start by defining a family of VCG auctions.
VCG-Family.
We say that a mechanism is in the VCG-family if its allocation x(v) ∈ P is such that
Notice that there might be more than one such mechanism: if v is normal to an edge of the polytope, then the entire edge is in the argmax. Nevertheless, v 2 ) are common for the entire family, as we see in the following lemma. A consequence of this fact is that the payment function might not be unique, but π (v 1 +, v 2 ) and π (v 1 , v 2 +) are unique. 
, then say that x 1 (v 1 +, v 2 ) >x 1 (v 1 +, v 2 ). Since both are in the boundary of the polytope, it means that for all (v 1 , v 2 ) with v 1 > v 1 , x 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) ≥ x 1 (v 1 +, v 2 ), since the points to the right of x(v 1 +, v 2 ) are clearly better than the ones to the left of it. Sox 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) can't converge tox 1 (v 1 +, v 2 ) < x 1 (v 1 , x 2 ).
To illustrate this fact, consider the simple case of P = {x ∈ R 2 + ; x 1 + x 2 ≤ 1}. Then, the VCG mechanism is well defined for x 1 = x 2 , which is, simply to allocate to the player with the highest value the entire amount. But notice that completing this mechanism with any allocation in the points (v, v) generates a truthful mechanism. The payments of different mechanisms of the VCG family differ on (v, v) , for example π i (v, v) = vx i (v), but notice that the payments everywhere else are well defined.
Pareto-Optimal Mechanisms. Now we turn our attention back to Pareto-optimal mechanisms for two budget-constrained players. Let (x, π) be such mechanism. As a direct consequence of the characterization of Pareto-optimal outcomes (Lemma 2.1), we know the following:
And a simple consequence of truthfulness
Now, we are ready to start proving the characterization theorem. We will characterize the mechanism in terms of the regions in the space of valuations where the budgets get exhausted. Formally, we are interested in understanding the sets:
PROOF. Assume that E 1 ∩ E 2 is not empty. Then we will prove the lemma in two parts. For the first part we will prove two statements:
. Then, for the second part, we show that this whole region that has constant allocation has budget exhausted for the two players. See Figure 2 for an illustration of the proof.
, since budgets are exhausted so the allocation can't increase. By monotonicity,
. Since all allocations lie in the boundary of the polytope, we must have
, by the exact same argument as previously mentioned, we show that x(v * ) = x(v 0 ). Now, if a i = inf {v i ; v ∈ E 1 ∩E 2 }, let us show that, for v > a, v ∈ E 1 ∩E 2 . Let us show that v ∈ E 2 and then E 1 is analogous. By definition, there is some v ∈ E 1 ∩ E 2 with v 1 < v 1 . Then, (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ E 2 since the allocation is constant, for v > a, the budget of 2 is exhausted in (v 1 , v 2 ) iff it is exhausted in (v 1 , v 2 ). Now, note that by monotonicity x 1 (v 1 , u) ≤ x 1 (v 1 , u) and since allocation is in the boundary of the polytope,
18:20 G. Goel et al. strictly above this line, by a similar argument used in Lemma 5.5: look at the allocation curves x 2 (v 1 , v 2 ) ≥ x 2 (v 1 , v 2 ) and the payment formula -then player 2 must be paying just above the {t · u i ; t ≥ 0} for v 1 line at least as much as he was paying above this line for v 1 and hence his budgets must be exhausted.
Proof of the Impossibility Theorem
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 5.3, which states that there is no general auction with all the desirable properties for all polyhedral environments P. We fix the following setting: a set of feasible allocations P = x ∈ R 2 + ; 2x 1 + x 2 ≤ 6, x 1 + 2x 2 ≤ 6 and budgets B 1 = B 2 = 1. Assume that (x, π) is a mechanism with the desirable properties for this setting. We will use the characterization lemmas in Section 5.2 to find a contradiction. We illustrate the flow of the proof in Figure 4 (a brief summary of the proof is given in the caption of the figure). PROOF. We can apply the same argument exchanging 1 and 2 and conclude that v 1 =ṽ 2 . Now, to see that for ,ṽ 2 ) × [ṽ 2 , ∞) is a little trickier. We do the analysis for the first one. The second is analogous.
Clearly π 2 (ṽ 1 ,ṽ 2 ) = 1. Now, for v 1 >ṽ 1 , x(v 1 ,ṽ 2 ) = x(ṽ 1 ,ṽ 2 ) = (2, 2). And for all v 2 we have x 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) ≥ x 1 (ṽ 1 , v 2 ) and therefore
Therefore, π 2 (v 1 ,ṽ 2 ) = 1, since the mechanism respects budgets. Notice that the only way it can be true is that if
We can use the exact same argument for region: , so the budget of player 2 never gets exhausted even for v 2 → ∞. This contradicts Paretooptimality for v 2 > 2v 1 , since if his budget is not exhausted, he should get allocated at least as much as he gets in VCG.
Multiunit Auctions with Decreasing Marginals
As a by-product of Theorem 5.3, we can answer in a negative way the question of the existence of truthful Pareto-optimal auctions for multiunit auctions with decreasing marginals. Consider the following setting:
Setting. Consider a supply of s of a certain divisible good and two players in such a way that the feasible allocations are (x 1 , x 2 ) such that x 1 + x 2 ≤ s. Player i has a public budget B i and a private valuation which is a increasing concave function V i : [0, s] → R + . Upon getting x i units of the good and paying π i , player i has utility u i = V i (x i ) − π i .
It is tempting to believe that one could adapt the clinching framework in Algorithm 1 to deal with this setting, by simply redefining the demand function as something like
where ∂ V i (x i ) is the marginal valuation at x i . Indeed, if V i (x i ) = v i · x i , this recovers the original way of calculating demands. In Appendix B, we give a counter-example showing that the clinching framework with this new demand function results in a nontruthful mechanism. The intuition behind the counter example is that some player can increase his declared value on items he won't get anyway in order to increase the payment of his opponent, exhausting his budget earlier. This way, he is able to get items for cheaper in the end.
In the following theorem, we show that no auction mechanism can satisfy all the desirable properties for this setting.
THEOREM 5.11. There is no truthful, Pareto-optimal and budget-feasible auction for this setting.
PROOF. Suppose that (x(V 1 , V 2 ),π (V 1 , V 2 )) is a mechanism satisfying all the desirable properties for multiunit auctions with decreasing marginals. Then, we can use it as a black-box to construct a mechanism for a general polyhedral environment, contradicting Theorem 5.3. Given a certain polyhedral environment, we can describe The mechanism is clearly truthful, individually rational and budget-feasible. It is also easy to see that sets of allocation can me mapped 1-1 between those two settings, preserving Pareto-optimality.
APPENDIXES
A. FASTER CLINCHING SUB-ROUTINES
In Lemma 3.5, we showed that, for any generic polymatroidal environment P, we can perform the clinching step in polynomial time if we have oracle access to the submodular function defining the polymatroid. In order to do so, we solve a submodular minimization problem. For most practical applications, however, one can design much simpler and faster algorithms for clinching. Clinching involves solving the following problem: given an environment P, x ∈ P and d ∈ R n + we want to compute max{1 t y; x + y ∈ P, 0 ≤ y ≤ d}.
We illustrate how to solve this problem efficiently for the single-keyword AdWords polytope: given α 1 ≥ α 2 ≥ · · · ≥ α n , consider the environment PROOF. If we drop the restriction that y ≥ 0 in (3), then it is easy to see that y = z − x is an optimal solution to this problem using, for example, a local exchange argument. Now, we show that we can fix this problem, by modifying z such that z ≥ x.
In order to fix that, consider the smaller i such that z i < x i . By the definition of z i , it must be the case that z i = the fact that x ∈ P. Notice we can increase z i by some small δ and decrease z k by a small δ. And obtain another vector z which is also such that z ∈ P, z ≤ x + d and has the same 1 t z value (the fact that z ∈ P after this transformation is due to the nature of the constraints). We can repeat this process until we get z ≥ x.
B. COUNTER EXAMPLE TO CLINCHING WITH DECREASING MARGINALS
Consider the setting of multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginals described in Section 5.4, and the variant of the clinching auction in Algorithm 1 where demands are calculated by
Our main claim here is that this auction is not truthful. We show that by providing an example: consider an initial supply of s = 2 budgets B 1 = ∞, B 2 = 4 and valuations:
The outcome of that is x 1 = 1, x 2 = 1 and π 1 = 3, π 2 = 1 since budgets never get exhausted. Now, we show that player 1 has a profitable deviation. He could report the following valuation insteadṼ
The the price clock increases up to 2 without any clinching. For 2+, the demand of player 1 drops and player 2 is able to clinch one unit by the price of 2, remaining with budget 2. Now, as price goes up, player 2's demand keeps decreasing, since his leftover budget is only 2 and the price is greater than 2. As a result, player 1 will be able to start clinching at price p = 2+ and therefore will havex 1 = 1,π 1 < 3, which is a strict improvement over the truth-telling strategy.
